



European Union Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators

EU energy market developments: Near-term outlook and focus areas

*Recent developments in energy markets
and their impact on the fiscal policy
response in the euro area*

Meeting of the Eurogroup on 13 February 2023 - Brussels

Christian Zinglensen & Dennis Hesselting, ACER




- *The glass half full:* Recent energy market developments & main factors
- *The glass half empty:* Though far from 'out of the woods' yet ...
- *What to do about it:* Implications for near-term focus & vigilance
- *How about further ahead:* Beyond the near-term, the recent past may provide a few lessons

Recent energy market developments & main factors

Wholesale price decrease after 2022 ‘rollercoaster’ ride


Electricity & natural gas price evolution, January 2021- February 2023 (Month Ahead, EUR/MWh)



Better than expected demand-supply balance has driven energy prices further down in the last months.

Gas demand reductions have played a key role


Total and sectorial gas demand evolutions across Member States – 2022 vs 2019-2021 average (%)



Mild winter weather has contributed to lower heating needs, next to overall demand reduction efforts. Highest contributions have come from industry. Household consumption has generally decreased. Power sector contributions vary.

Supply alternatives to Russian gas coming strong


Daily evolution of gas imports by supply route from January 2021 to February 2023 (bcm/day)



The drop in Russian pipeline supply continues to be offset by rising EU LNG imports and lower overall demand. As a result, gas storage outflows to meet demand so far are lower this winter.

Gas storage 'supply' remains high this winter


EU gas storage levels evolution – 2017 – 2023 (% of total capacity)




Storage filling levels are above last years' average and have contributed to driving prices down. Stocks are anticipated to finish above 50% by the end of winter 2022-2023.

Past 'LNG receiving bottlenecks' now improving

Central and North-West LNG import capacity and flows – 2021-2024 (mcm/day)




Overview of new EU LNG planned capacity – October 2022



**More LNG terminals coming online make for greater LNG import capacity.
 Quicker planning, permitting and building for what normally takes several years.**

Electricity supply likely ‘turning a corner’

Year-on-year change in electricity generation in 2022 and prospects in 2023 (TWh)




EU power consumption fell by -3% year-on-year in 2022 (in contrast to -21% overall reduction of EU gas demand), with most of the drop occurring in winter. Renewable and nuclear power generation is anticipated to rise in 2023 (for nuclear, from its historical low in 2022), whilst total EU power demand is expected to remain low. As a result, coal & gas fired generation is projected to sizeably drop this year*.

Source: EMBER [European Electricity Review 2023](#). Note: Other include bioenergy, other renewables, other fossil fuels and net imports.

Note: Gas-fired power generation rose slightly year-on-year in 2022 (+ 5 TWh, approx. 1-2%), with summer and early autumn accounting for most of rise, whilst winter dropped back again.

Providing (some) relief to retail prices

**Representative household prices including and excluding support schemes in the EU,
 June 2021 – December 2022 (EUR/MWh)**




Retail energy prices often fall more slowly than they rise. Several factors are at play, e.g. some suppliers incurring significant losses in 2022 seeing opportunity to recoup parts of those losses plus some consumers having signed fixed price contracts (meaning prices paid by those consumers will remain flat, at least for some time).

**However, we are far from being ‘out of
the woods’ yet ...**

Gas price expectations remain higher than pre-crisis


Two-year evolution of TTF and EEX future prices - November 2022 and January 2023 (EUR/MWh)



Although gas and power futures' prices have substantially dropped in the last months, they remain almost three times above recent historical average.

Much hinges on demand reductions & weather impacts

EU estimated gas balances – 1 February to 30 September 2023




Even though gas storages are expected to end the winter season relatively well-replenished, factors like rising gas demand due e.g. to cold weather or non-sustained demand reductions provide grounds for caution. (By way of example, Bruegel estimates a ‘base case’ need for 13% demand reduction, adding a 5–7 %-points ‘swing’ up or down per weather conditions).

Source: Bruegel, *Preparing for the next winter, Europe’s gas outlook for 2023*

Note: 3 scenarios considered. The baseline scenario assumes that Russian pipeline flows continue across Ukraine and Turkstream (‘UA/TS’). Scenario ‘TS’ assumes that Russian flows only continue across Turk stream. ‘NRPG’ assumes no Russian pipeline gas. EU countries agreed to reduce gas demand by 15% between 1 August 2022 and 31 March 2023, compared to the average of the previous five years. **13**

Supply (global LNG) remains tight the next two years



Bloomberg

European Energy Prices Rise as US LNG Plant Set to Stay Offline

- Freeport LNG will likely extend an outage, curbing supplies
- Expected colder weather set to boost demand for heating

By Vanessa Dezem and Anna Shiryayevskaya
15 November 2022 at 08:17 CET Updated on 15 November 2022 at 18:51 CET

European Gas Falls Again With Focus on Demand, LNG Shipments


- Freeport LNG gets green light to restart some activities
- Traders are closely watching demand after recent price drop

By Elena Mazneva
2 February 2023 at 08:35 CET Updated on 2 February 2023 at 12:48 CET

The EU will compete for extra LNG volumes with Asia, which will see growing demand driven partly by overall economic growth, partly by lowering coal usage. Given market tightness, unexpected events, such as outages, can have outsized impacts, adding tension to global LNG supply and hence to EU gas prices.

With one particular ‘demand variable’ standing out

Changes to LNG imports from selected regions and global export growth – 2022 (TWh)




REUTERS
 World Business Legal Markets More
 Exploration & Production Refining LNG Fuel Oil Gas
 4 minute read · November 21, 2022 8:08 PM GMT+1 · Last Updated 3 months ago
Qatar seals 27-year LNG deal with China as competition heats up

China’s COVID-19 driven demand decline in LNG volumes was absorbed by Europe, while US LNG supply continues to grow. However, in 2023, in line with the expected increase in its economic growth, China’s LNG demand is expected to gradually rise, intensifying competition for overall LNG resources.

Implications for near-term focus & vigilance

Recent gas storage injection patterns hold lessons

Volatile value of gas impacting EU storage – 2019 - 2023 (bn euros)



EU successfully filled gas storages for the winter 2022/2023, but at a cost of approx. 100 billion, thus contributing to very high gas prices over the summer. Different instruments (e.g. Contracts for Differences) could be considered to reduce price volatility and/or the risk of unattractive seasonal price spreads. Similarly, more gradual replenishment trajectories, adding cost-sensitive incentives, could be considered.

Source: ACER based on IEA


Note: Injection assessed as the average prompt prices across summer months and withdrawals as the average prompt prices across winter months

Changed gas flows hit by ‘transportation bottlenecks’

**Utilisation ratio for selected EU IPs in Jan. 2018 – Jan. 2023
(% of technical capacity)**

Flow Direction	Interconnection Point	Average utilisation 2018-2021	Average utilisation 2022	Average utilisation 01/11/22 to 19/12/22	Average utilisation 20/12/22 to 11/01/23
AT to DE	VIP Oberkappel	10%	5%	30%	13%
AT to IT	Tarvisio-Arnoldstein	67%	26%	9%	3%
BE to DE	VIP THE-ZTP		138%	119%	145%
BE to FR	Virtualys	26%	0%	0%	0%
BE to NL	VIP-BENE	24%	79%	64%	93%
DE to AT	VIP Oberkappel	52%	79%	28%	22%
DE to BE	VIP THE-ZTP		0%	0%	0%
DE to FR	VIP France - Germany	45%	14%	0%	0%
DE to NL	VIP TTF H		46%	55%	49%
ES to FR	Vip Pirineos	3%	33%	52%	51%
FR to DE	VIP France - Germany	0%	44%	45%	64%
FR to ES	Vip Pirineos	41%	15%	5%	5%
IT to AT	Tarvisio-Arnoldstein	0%	3%	8%	12%
NL to DE	VIP TTF H		70%	117%	95%
NL to DE	VIP TTF L	44%	30%	36%	33%
NO to NL	Emden	2%	35%	25%	28%
PL to DE	Yamal	77%	1%	0%	0%
PT to ES	VIP Iberico	4%	12%	14%	8%
UK to BE	Zeebrugge IZT	18%	71%	56%	96%

Congestion revenues per country in 2022* (EUR)




Congestion revenues have increased drastically to EUR 4 billion in 2022 (compared to EUR 55 million in 2021). Germany and the Netherlands have the most congested entries, while Belgium and France have the most congested exits.

Source: ACER based on GSA, PRISMA and RBP - gas transportation cong. revenues calculation is based on auction time (in 2022), not on delivery time (i.e. includes prod. for delivery after 2022)

Note: *Mem. States & third count. with cong. reven. exceeding EUR 10 MM during auctions held in 2022. (Swiss cong. reven. for transit Wallbach-Passo Gries, estimated at EUR 245 MM, but not depicted.) **19**

Demand 'reduction' vs demand 'destruction'?


EU 27 manufacturing output by sector




- Industrial energy consumption has decreased significantly in 2022.
- Despite this, overall manufacturing output is above past years average.
- However, output differs by sector, presumably a function of substitution and/or enhanced efficiency options.
- Generally, manufacturing relying on gas as feedstock (as opposed to fuel) has fewer substitution options.

Accelerating electricity new-build (esp. low-lead time)

Share of EU power generation per technology – 2022 (%)




Annual change in solar electricity generation – 2000 – 2022 (TWh)




For the first time in the EU, wind and solar generation produced more electricity in 2022 than gas. New solar capacity additions - a particularly low-lead time generation source - doubled in 2022 compared to the year before.

Support measures may well need adjusting ...

Magnitude of support schemes to household and industrial consumers in the EU, Norway and UK, September 2021- November 2022 (% of 2021 GDP)




Type of support measures provided to consumers – 2022



To date ~EUR 600 billion+ have been spent on support measures in the EU. If support measures are retained, experience offers lessons e.g. for further targeting such measures plus retaining incentives to lower demand.

Beyond the near-term, the recent past may provide a few lessons

A demand-led transition



- “... The uncertainties around long-term fossil fuel demand and supply-side fossil fuel investments mean that **demand-side responses are now more important than ever ...**”
- “... The **speed at which fossil fuel infrastructure can safely be retired depends** crucially on the speed at which **clean energy technologies are deployed** and **fossil fuel demand declines ...**”

Focusing on supply-side restrictive measures as opposed to (also) focusing on demand-side measures may bring strong upward pressure on prices. Also, targets do not constitute results.

Volatility is here to stay: A problem or a call to action?

Diverging views on how to tackle price volatility

'Volatility needs to be avoided' (e.g. new pricing rules)


VS

'Volatility needs to be managed'

What are the **tools to tackle price volatility** in ACER's view?


- Preserve price signals: today's volatility triggers tomorrow's flexibility (technologies)
- **Strengthened EU market integration**
- Improved forward markets
- Consumer protection remains key
- Longer-term contracting may play a role (if done well, avoiding distortive effects)

Price volatility (EUR/MWh) in integrated and isolated electricity markets in the EU in 2021




Dependence (import/export) often cuts both ways

Import ~ export swings from 2021 to 2022 *



% of electricity net import hours in 2022



Making cross-border electricity capacity available for trade (per also the so-called ‘70% target’) is vitally important for many Member States. This also includes Member States that are predominant electricity exporters over the year.

* Covers all months for 2021 and January – September for 2022
Note: Without MT, CY, IE

The EU holds advantages; will they be leveraged?

“... whilst increased energy independence vis-à-vis (particular) third-countries is a policy objective of growing importance, realising this may well depend on enhanced energy inter-dependence amongst EU Member States.”



Further strengthening a ‘shared resources’ model across the EU requires investment; in infrastructure, rules, institutions and governance. Importantly, it also requires political investment in the ‘comfort levels’ of being more (inter-)dependent on other Member States for one’s energy needs.

*Thank you for your attention.
Looking forward to the discussion.*



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Annex



- **Supporting the integration of energy markets in the EU** (by common rules at EU level). Primarily directed towards transmission system operators and power exchanges.
- **Contributing to efficient trans-European energy infrastructure**, ensuring alignment with EU priorities.
- Monitoring the well-functioning and transparency of energy markets, **detering market manipulation and abusive behaviour**.
- Where necessary, **coordinating cross-national regulatory action**.
- Governance: **Regulatory oversight is shared** with national regulators. **Decision-making** within ACER is collaborative and joint (formal decisions requiring 2/3 majority of national regulators). **Decentralised enforcement** at national level.


1.	Executive Summary	4
2.	Gas price developments	9
2.1.	Observed results and market effects related to price developments	9
2.2.	Potential market effects and risks related to price developments	16
3.	Gas flow developments	17
3.1.	Observed results and market effects related to flow developments	17
3.2.	Potential market effects and risks related to flow developments	25
4.	Gas trading developments	26
4.1.	Observed results and market effects related to trading developments	26
4.2.	Potential market effects and risks related to trading developments	32

- ***“The effects of the Regulation seem to remain limited.*** No significant impacts can be unequivocally and directly attributed to the adoption of the MCM.”
- ***“It cannot be concluded that the MCM has played a relevant role in reducing EU gas prices.*** The lower prices seem driven by fundamental supply and demand factors.“
- ***“Gas supply has remained reasonably stable following the adoption of the MCM Regulation and security of supply has been well ensured.”***
- ***“The MCM Regulation has not prompted a discernible shift in trading activity.”***

ACER and ESMA published the two preliminary reports on 23 January with indicators to continue monitoring market developments and detect potential impacts and risks of the MCM.


New gas flows hit by ‘transportation bottlenecks’

Natural gas flow changes – first half of 2021 vs first half of 2022



The flow shift resulted in infrastructure congestion at North-West LNG terminals and at the gas pipelines flowing gas in West to East direction. In turn, this has moved hub spreads above historical averages.


'Energy redistribution' may still be relevant




Given the risks of further supply shocks and/or sudden price spikes in the next couple of years, it may still be relevant to have measures in place redistributing unusually high revenue earned in the electricity market. Recent experience provides lessons on opportunities and drawbacks of different options available.

One-sided focus on the supply-side holds risks (2/2)

Oil prices rise in a net zero emissions scenario driven by supply policies vs. decline when driven by demand policies (*US dollars a barrel*)




Counterfactuals for oil and gas capital expenditure



Focusing on supply-side restrictive measures as opposed to (also) focusing on demand-side measures may bring strong upward pressure on prices. Also, targets do not constitute results.

Electricity market diagnostics



Judging from experience, implementation takes time

Examples




Legislative process

The Clean Energy Package

11/2016 - 12/2020*

CACM Regulation

2012 – 08/2015




Implementation

Ongoing

- European Resource Adequacy Assessment (ERAA): 2024-2025
- Minimum capacity targets: 01/2026
- Imbalance settlement period: 01/2025

Ongoing

- Core Flow-based: 06/2022
- Nordic Flow-based: 2023
- Redispatching and countertrading: 2024
- Intraday auctions: 2024



Average implementation

Using existing governance & entities

approx. 3 - 6 years

Establishing new governance & entities

approx. 4 - 8 years