



ACER



European Union Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators

Avenues for reform of the electricity market

Informal Ministerial meeting in Prague on 11 – 12 October 2022
Czech Council Presidency of the EU
Christian Zinglensen, ACER Director



- What to make of our energy challenges next year?
- ‘Getting it right’ for the next 10-15 years:
 - The *when*: Effects of a reform likely to kick-in by when
 - The *what*: Key elements to tackle
- Early lessons for energy transition policies going forward
- A final word on what to avoid ...

Challenges facing us next year(s)

‘Beginning of the end’ vs. ‘end of the beginning’?

Europe | Shiver for longer

Europe’s next energy crunch


The winter of 2023 could be worse than 2022

**The
Economist**



Current gas storage ‘success’ has come with a price


EU¹ gas storage build and LNG imports – April to October (2016 - 2022)




After significantly higher injections than in 2021, EU gas storages are on track to be filled to capacity by the start of the heating season (+90%) but reportedly at eight times historical costs (est. 50 billion euros).

Hence, gas storage faces challenges next winter

Scenario for winter 2022-2023 - EU + UK - bcm/winter



Scenario for winter 2023-2024 - EU + UK - bcm/winter




‘A season of if’s’: Europe might face demand curtailments in winter 2023/2024 *if* gas storages are fully depleted during winter 2022/2023 and/or not sufficiently replenished in summer 2023; *if* Russian supplies fully halt; *if* larger volumes of LNG are diverted to Asia; and/or *if* gas demand rises (due to e.g. cold weather or demand reduction targets not being met).

Source: Estimates; ACER based on Timera and ENTSOG

* Stocks can't be fully depleted by end-winter for operational reasons


LNG capacity remains tight in the coming years

Global LNG liquefaction capacity additions by regions by start-up year – 2016-2026



The EU will compete for extra volumes with Asia which will see growing demand, partly for overall economic growth, partly for lowering coal usage.

With one particular ‘demand variable’ standing out



- China’s COVID-driven demand decline in LNG volumes is currently being absorbed by Europe while US LNG supply continues to grow.
- This raises questions as to when China’s LNG demand may turn back towards normal growth rates.

Implications for reform of the electricity market: Effects to kick-in by when?

Judging from experience, implementation takes time

Examples




Legislative process

The Clean Energy Package

11/2016 - 12/2020*

CACM Regulation

2012 – 08/2015




Implementation

Ongoing

- European Resource Adequacy Assessment (ERAA): 2024-2025
- Minimum capacity targets: 01/2026
- Imbalance settlement period: 01/2025

Ongoing

- Core Flow-based: 06/2022
- Nordic Flow-based: 2023
- Redispatching and countertrading: 2024
- Intraday auctions: 2024



Average implementation

Using existing governance & entities

approx. 3 - 6 years


Establishing new governance & entities

approx. 4 - 8 years

* Note: Includes transposition into national law

By way of example, the UK's electricity market review

An overview of elements in the UK's ongoing electricity market review (REMA)



- Thorough consultation and analysis process stretching well into 2023
- Multiple options for review across various dimensions
- Sequence of consultation, analysis of input, further consultation, then analysis etc.
- **Ending with a full delivery plan and overseeing implementation (from the mid-2020s)**

Implications for reform of the electricity market: 'Getting it right' for the next 10-15 years

A spectrum of reform options to consider



Targeting long-term markets

Improving long-term markets

- Supporting liquidity
- Enhanced forward markets integration, e.g. by coupling forward markets for long-term cross-zonal capacities

Introducing government-driven mechanisms

- Specific mechanisms to drive investments in renewables and/or flexibility: CRMs, CfDs, support for PPAs.
- Insurance mechanisms: Affordability options to protect consumers, two-sided options to protect both consumers and producers

Targeting short-term markets







Structurally reforming short-term markets

- Splitting the market per generation type (dispatchable vs. not dispatchable, etc.)
- Improving locational price signals (nodal pricing, local markets.....)

'Average pricing' via different mechanisms

In the current high price setting, many proposals aim at strong investment signals for new-build; more (cost-based) average pricing; less price volatility; thereby also tackling the impact e.g. of gas generation prices on consumers. There are several options for achieving the desired objectives.

Key questions to be posed towards such options


Criteria	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	Option
 <p>Affordability?</p>	✓	✓	✓	...
 <p>Security of supply & facilitates cross-border flows?</p>	✗	✓	✓	...
 <p>Energy transition compliant?</p>	✗	✓	✓	...
 <p>Signals for needed demand response?</p>	✓	✗	✓	...
 <p>Investment signals (incl. for CAPEX-intensive technologies)?</p>	✓	✗	✓	...
 <p>Implementation time?</p>	✓	✓	✗	...

How a contract for difference (CfD) works



“... In some Member States, the revenues obtained by some generators are already capped by way of State measures such as ... two-way contracts for difference. These generators do not benefit from increased revenues resulting from the recent spike of electricity prices. Therefore, existing producers subject to that type of State measure ... should be excluded from the application of the cap ...”

Another element: Zero-marginal cost & 'missing money'



More of a discussion some years ago, the challenge of potentially 'missing money' & 'revenue cannibalisation' is countered by the enhanced uptake of storage and electrolysis, adding revenue streams by 'shifting' generation across time frames. However, instituting price limits may hamper investment incentives for such technologies, thus inadvertently bringing back past discussions on 'missing money' & 'revenue cannibalisation'.


Early lessons for energy transition policies up ahead

It's the supply. No, it's the demand. No, it's the ...




One-sided focus on the supply-side has risks

Oil prices rise in a net zero emissions scenario driven by supply policies vs. decline when driven by demand policies (*US dollars a barrel*)




Counterfactuals for oil and gas capital expenditure



Focusing on supply-side restrictive measures as opposed to (also) focusing on demand-side measures may bring strong upward pressure on prices. Also, targets do not constitute results. Recent history holds lessons.

The EU holds advantages; will they be leveraged?

“... whilst increased energy independence vis-à-vis (particular) third-countries is a policy objective of growing importance, realising this may well depend on enhanced energy inter-dependence amongst EU Member States.”




Further strengthening a ‘shared resources’ model across the EU requires investment; in infrastructure, rules, institutions and governance. Importantly, it also requires political investment in the ‘comfort levels’ of being more (inter-)dependent on other Member States for one’s energy needs.

A final word on what to avoid

The gas supply picture has changed dramatically


Gas supply corridors and flows to the EU (October 2021 - September 2022), TWh/month




After the latest reduction in Gazprom exports, Russian pipeline supply represents an estimated 9-10% of EU daily gas imports.

Revealing diverging vulnerabilities across Member States

Natural gas flow changes – first half of 2021 vs first half of 2022



Evolution of net electricity export (or import) of France




- France, one of the biggest EU exporters of power over the last years, **became a significant net importer in 2022.**
- This ‘export-to-import’ swing of 56TWh is **as big as the total demand of Belgium during the same period.**


‘In view of the great uncertainties regarding decisions taken in neighbouring countries, balancing the electricity system in France will necessarily rely on very strong cooperation with neighbouring countries.’

Import ~ export swings from 2021 to 2022

*



% of net import hours in 2022



Making cross-border electricity capacity available for trade (per also the so-called ‘70% target’) will be vitally important for many Member States. This also includes Member States that are predominant electricity exporters over the year.

* Covers all months for 2021 and January – September for 2022

Note: Without MT, CY, IE

***Thank you for your attention.
Looking forward to the discussion.***


Annex



- **Supporting the integration of energy markets in the EU** (by common rules at EU level). Primarily directed towards transmission system operators and power exchanges.
- **Contributing to efficient trans-European energy infrastructure**, ensuring alignment with EU priorities.
- Monitoring the well-functioning and transparency of energy markets, **detering market manipulation and abusive behaviour**.
- Where necessary, **coordinating cross-national regulatory action**.
- Governance: **Regulatory oversight is shared** with national regulators. **Decision-making** within ACER is collaborative and joint (formal decisions requiring 2/3 majority of national regulators). **Decentralised enforcement** at national level.

So far, ‘gas demand flexibility’ came from industry

Drop in gas industrial consumption for selected European countries vs extra EU gas demand for power generation – bcm/month – 2022 vs 2018-2021 average




Industry and power generation each account for roughly one third of total EU gas demand. Industrial demand has dropped by 30% since August 2022, while gas demand power generation has risen by 8% year-to-date. The recent electricity demand reduction targets, if realised, are likely to counter the latter. Record high prices are forcing energy intensive industrial users to limit, stop or outsource production.

Uptick in EU coal and gas power needed to cover huge drop in nuclear and hydro

EMBER

Year-on-year change in EU-27 electricity generation by fuel type for January - August 2022 (terawatt hours)



Favourable solar conditions over much of Europe. Despite low wind output over the summer, overall high wind yields in 2022 (compared to unusually low wind output in 2021).

Coal increase per gas-to-coal switching. Production impacted by fuel supply logistics (e.g. Rhine) and plant closures.

Lower availability of nuclear plants for technical and drought related reasons.


Drought impacting overall hydro production.

Source: Ember
Other includes bioenergy, other renewables and other fossil fuels

2021 generation:
1,754 TWh

TSOs are collecting unprecedented congestion rents*


Gas TSO's network congestion rent – January to September 2022



Limited capacities on new supply routes have resulted in TSOs collecting unprecedented congestion rents. ACER estimates that congestion rents* have reached 3.4 billion euros between January and September 2022 - in the whole of 2021 they amounted to 55 million euros.

‘Gas driving electricity prices ...’ is not the full story


Gas-fired power generation in EU-27 – TWh/day –2021 - 2022



Despite record-high gas prices, gas-fired power generation has increased year-on-year due e.g. to low hydro and nuclear availability issues.

So cyclically, new LNG investment will be coming - right?


Estimated change in upstream oil and gas spending by selected company types (2019-2022E)



Upstream oil and gas investment is changing, with only the spending by Middle East national energy companies above pre-pandemic levels. This raises the question whether past 'cyclical dynamics' still apply.

Current Russian gas supply cannot just ‘go elsewhere’


Existing and potential Russian gas exports to Asia vs Russian export to EU + UK



Russia expected to prioritise new export capacity, in particular towards China. This will involve significant investment and price concessions. Volumes are highly unlikely to make up for current EU + UK exports.

Investment in ‘new solutions’; yes, but it takes time

Comparison of the REPowerEU Plan installed electrolysis capacity target with capacity of EU projects in the pipeline, 2030



European low-carbon hydrogen capacity additions

